Practical and Provably Secure Onion Routing by Ando, Megumi et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
05
36
7v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 A
pr
 20
18
Practical and Provably Secure Onion Routing
Megumi Ando, Anna Lysyanskaya, and Eli Upfal
Computer Science Department, Brown University,
Providence, RI 02912 USA
{mando, anna, eli}@cs.brown.edu
Abstract. In an onion routing protocol, messages travel through several
intermediaries before arriving at their destinations; they are wrapped in
layers of encryption (hence they are called “onions”). The goal is to make
it hard to establish who sent the message. It is a practical and widespread
tool for creating anonymous channels.
For the standard adversary models — network, passive, and active —
we present practical and provably secure onion routing protocols. Akin
to Tor, in our protocols each party independently chooses the routing
paths for his onions. For security parameter λ, our differentially private
solution for the active adversary takes O(log2 λ) rounds and requires
every participant to transmit O(log4 λ) onions in every round.
1 Introduction
Anonymous channels are a prerequisite for protecting user privacy. But how
do we achieve anonymous channels in an Internet-like network that consists of
point-to-point links?
If a user Alice wishes to send a message m to a user Bob, she may begin by
encrypting her messagem under Bob’s public key to obtain the ciphertext cBob =
Enc(pkBob ,m). But sending cBob directly to Bob would allow an eavesdropper
to observe that Alice is in communication with Bob. So instead, Alice may
designate several intermediate relays, called “mix-nodes” (typically chosen at
random) and send the ciphertext through them, “wrapped” in several layers of
encryption so that the ciphertext received by a mix-node cannot be linked to
the ciphertext sent out by the mix-node. Each node decrypts each ciphertext it
receives (“peels off” a layer of encryption) and discovers the identity of the next
node and the ciphertext to send along. This approach to hiding who is talking to
whom is called “onion routing” [Cha81] (sometimes it is also called “anonymous
remailer” [DDM03]) because the ciphertexts are layered, akin to onions; from
now on we will refer to such ciphertexts as “onions”.
Onion routing is attractive for several reasons: (1) simplicity: users and devel-
opers understand how it works; the only cryptographic tool it uses is encryption;
(2) fault-tolerance: it can easily tolerate and adapt to the failure of a subset of
mix-nodes; (3) scalability: its performance remains the same even as more and
more users and mix-nodes are added to the system. As a result, onion routing is
what people use to obscure their online activities. According to current statistics
published by the Tor Project, Inc., Tor is used by millions of users every day to
add privacy to their communications [DMS04,DM05]1.
In spite of its attractiveness and widespread use, the security of onion routing
is not well-understood.
The definitional question — what notion of security do we want to achieve?
— has been studied [SW06, FJS07, FJS12, BKM+14]. The most desirable no-
tion, which we will refer to as “statistical privacy”, requires that the adversary’s
view in the protocol be distributed statistically independently of who is trying
to send messages to whom2. Unfortunately, a network adversary observing the
traffic flowing out of Alice and flowing into Bob can already make inferences
about whether Alice is talking to Bob. For example, if the adversary knows that
Alice is sending a movie to someone, but there isn’t enough traffic flowing into
Bob’s computer to suggest that Bob is receiving a movie, then Bob cannot be
Alice’s interlocutor. (Participants’ inputs may also affect others’ privacy in other
ways [FJS12].)
So let us consider the setting in which, in principle, statistical privacy can
be achieved: every party wants to anonymously send and receive just one short
message to and from some other party. Let us call this “the simple input-output
(I/O) setting”. In the simple I/O setting, anonymity can be achieved even against
an adversary who can observe the entire network if there is a trusted party
through whom all messages are routed. Can onion routing that does not rely
on one trusted party emulate such a trusted party in the presence of a powerful
adversary?
Specifically, we may be dealing with the network adversary that observes all
network traffic; or the stronger passive adversary that, in addition to observing
network traffic, also observes the internal states of a fraction of the network
nodes; or the most realistic active adversary that observes network traffic and
also controls a fraction of the nodes. Prior work analyzing Tor [FJS07, FJS12,
BKM+14] did not consider these standard adversary models. Instead, they fo-
cused on the adversary who was entirely absent from some regions of the network,
but resourceful adversaries (such as the NSA) and adversaries running sophis-
ticated attacks (such as BGP hijacking [SEF+17]) may receive the full view of
the network traffic, and may also infiltrate the collection of mix-nodes.
Surprisingly, despite its real-world importance, we were the first to consider
this question.
Warm-up:An oblivious permutation algorithm between a memory-constrained
client and an untrusted storage server enables the client to permute a sequence
1 Tor stands for “the onion router”, and even though the underlying mechanics are
somewhat different from what we described above (instead of using public-key en-
cryption, participants carry out key exchange so that the rest of the communication
can be more efficient), the underlying theory is still the same.
2 Technically, since onion routing uses encryption, the adversary’s view cannot be
statistically independent of the input, but at best computationally independent.
However, as we will see, if we work in an idealized encryption model, such as in
Canetti’s FEnc-hybrid model [Can01], statistical privacy makes sense.
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of (encrypted) data blocks stored on the server without the server learning any-
thing (in the statistical sense) about the permutation.
Theorem 1. Any oblivious permutation algorithms can be adapted into a com-
munications protocol for achieving statistical privacy from the network adversary.
As an example, Ohrimenko et al. [OGTU14] presented a family of efficient obliv-
ious permutation algorithms. This can be adapted into a secure and “tunable”
OR protocol that can trade off between low server load and latency. Letting λ
denote the security parameter, for any B ∈ [
√
N
log2 λ
], this protocol can be set to
run inO( logNlogB ) rounds with communication complexity overheadO(
B logN log2 λ
logB )
and server load O(B log2 λ). (See Appendix C.)
However, to be secure from the passive adversary, we need more resources.
We prove for the first time that onion routing can provide statistical privacy
from the passive adversary, while being efficient.
1. We prove that our solution, Πp, is statistically private from any passive ad-
versary capable of monitoring any constant κ ∈ [0, 1) of the mix-nodes, while
having communication complexity overheadO(log2 λ), server load O(log2 λ),
and latency O(log2 λ), where λ denotes the security parameter. (See Sec-
tion 4.)
However, for most realistic input settings (not constrained to the simple I/O
setting), statistical privacy is too ambitious a goal. It is not attainable even with
a trusted third party. Following recent literature [BKM+14,vdHLZZ15], for our
final result, let us not restrict users’ inputs, and settle for a weaker notion of
privacy, namely, differential privacy.
Our definition of differential privacy requires that the difference between the
adversary’s view when Alice sends a message to Bob and its view when she does
not send a message at all or sends it to Carol instead, is small. This is mean-
ingful; showing that the protocol achieves differential privacy gives every user
a guarantee that sending her message through does not change the adversary’s
observations very much.
2. Our solution, Πa, can defend against the active adversary while having com-
munication complexity overhead O(log6 λ), server load O(log4 λ), and la-
tency O(log2 λ). This is the first provably secure peer-to-peer solution that
also provides a level of robustness; unless the adversary forces the honest
players to abort the protocol run, most messages that are not dropped by
the adversary are delivered to their final destinations. (See Section 5.)
To prepare onions, we use a cryptographic scheme that is strong enough that,
effectively, the only thing that the active adversary can do with onions generated
by honest parties is to drop them (see the onion cryptosystem by Camenisch
and Lysyanskaya [CL05] for an example of a sufficiently strong cryptosystem).
Unfortunately, even with such a scheme, it is still tricky to protect Alice’s privacy
against an adversary that targets Alice specifically. Suppose that an adversarial
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Bob is expecting a message of a particular form from an anonymous interlocutor,
and wants to figure out if it was Alice or not. If the adversary succeeds in blocking
all of Alice’s onions and not too many of the onions from other parties, and then
Bob never receives the expected message, then the adversary’s hunch that it was
Alice will be confirmed.
How do we prevent this attack? For this attack to work, the adversary would
have to drop a large number of onions — there is enough cover traffic in our
protocol that dropping just a few onions does not do much. But once a large
enough number of onions is dropped, the honest mix-nodes will detect that
an attack is taking place, and will shut down before any onions are delivered
to their destinations. Specifically, if enough onions survive half of the rounds,
then privacy is guaranteed through having sufficient cover; otherwise, privacy is
guaranteed because no message reaches its final destination with overwhelming
probability. So the adversary does not learn anything about the destination of
Alice’s onions.
In order to make it possible for the mix-nodes to detect that an attack is
taking place, our honest users create “checkpoint” onions. These onions don’t
carry any messages; instead, they are designed to be “verified” by a particular
mix-node in a particular round. These checkpoint onions are expected by the
mix-node, so if one of them does not arrive, the mix-node in question realizes
that something is wrong. If enough checkpoint onions are missing, the mix-node
determines that an attack is underway and shuts down. Two different users,
Alice and Allison, use a PRF with a shared key (this shared key need not be
pre-computed, but can instead be derived from a discrete-log based public-key
infrastructure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption; see Appendix A)
in order to determine whether Alice should create a checkpoint onion that will
mirror Allison’s checkpoint onion.
Related work. Encryption schemes that are appropriate for onion routing
are known [CL05,BGKM12]. Several papers attempted to define anonymity for
communications protocols and to analyze Tor [SW06,FJS07,FJS12]. Backes et
al. [BKM+14] were the first to consider a notion inspired by differential pri-
vacy [DMNS06] but, in analyzing Tor, they assume an adversary with only a
partial view of the network. There are also some studies on anonymity proto-
cols, other than onion routing protocols, that were analyzed using information-
theoretic measures [BFTS04, KB07, CPP08, DRS04, AAC+11]. In contrast, all
the protocols presented in this paper are provably secure against powerful ad-
versaries that can observe all network traffic. The system, Vuvuzela [vdHLZZ15],
assumes that all messages travel through the same set of dedicated servers and
is, therefore, impractical compared to Tor. Recently proposed systems, Sta-
dium [TGL+17] and Atom [KCGDF17] are distributed but not robust; they
rely on verifiable shuffling to detect and abort. A variant of Atom is robust at
a cost in security; it only achieves k-anonymity [KCGDF17]. In contrast, our
solution for the active adversary is distributed while maintaining low latency,
and robust while being provably secure.
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Achieving anonymous channels using heavier cryptographic machinery has
been considered also. One of the earliest examples is Chaum’s dining cryptogra-
pher’s protocol [Cha88]. Rackoff and Simon [RS93] use secure multiparty compu-
tation for providing security from active adversaries. Other cryptographic tools
used in constructing anonymity protocols include oblivious RAM (ORAM) and
private information retrieval (PIR) [CB95,CBM15]. Corrigan-Gibbs et al.’s Ri-
poste solution makes use of a global bulletin board and has a latency of a couple
of days [CBM15]. The aforementioned Stadium [KCGDF17] is another solution
for a public forum. Blaze et al. [BIK+09] provided an anonymity protocol in the
wireless (rather than point-to-point) setting.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. By the notation [n], we mean the set {1, . . . , n} of integers. The
output a of an algorithm A is denoted by a ← A. For a set S, we write s ← S
to represent that s is a uniformly random sample from the set S and |S|, to
represent its cardinality. A realization d of a distribution D is denoted d ∼ D;
by d ∼ Binomial(N, p), we mean that d is a realization of a binomial random
variable with parameters N and p. By log(n), we mean the logarithm of n, base
2; and by ln(n), we mean the natural log of n.
A function f : N → R is negligible in λ, written f(λ) = negl(λ), if for
every polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large λ, f(λ) < 1/p(λ). When λ is the
security parameter, we say that an event occurs with overwhelming probability
if it is the complement of an event with probability negligible in λ. Two families
of distributions {D0,λ}λ∈N and {D1,λ}λ∈N are statistically close if the statistical
distance between D0,λ and D1,λ is negligible in λ; we abbreviate this notion by
D0 ≈s D1 when the security parameter is clear by context. We use the standard
notion of a pseudorandom function [Gol01, Ch. 3.6].
Onion routing. Following Camenisch and Lysyanskaya’s work on cryptographic
onions [CL05], an onion routing scheme is a triple of algorithms:
(Gen,FormOnion,ProcOnion).
The algorithm, Gen, generates a public-key infrastructure for a set of parties. The
algorithm, FormOnion, forms onions; and the algorithm, ProcOnion, processes
onions.
Given a set [N ] of parties, for every i ∈ [N ], let (pki, ski) ← Gen(1λ) be the
key pair generated for party i ∈ [N ], where λ denotes the security parameter.
FormOnion takes as input: a message m, an ordered list (P1, . . . , PL+1) of
parties from [N ], and the public-keys (pkP1 , . . . , pkPL+1) associated with these
parties, and a list (s1, . . . , sL) of (possibly empty) strings that are nonces asso-
ciated with layers of the onion. The party PL+1 is interpreted as the recipient
of the message, and the list (P1, . . . , PL+1) is the routing path of the message.
The output of FormOnion is a sequence (O1, . . . , OL+1) of onions. Because it is
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convenient to think of an onion as a layered encryption object, where processing
an onion Or produces the next onion Or+1, we sometimes refer to the process of
revealing the next layer of an onion as “decrypting the onion”, or “peeling the
onion”. For every r ∈ [L], only party Pr can peel onion Or to reveal the next
layer,
(Pr+1, Or+1, sr+1)← ProcOnion(skPr , Or, Pr),
of the onion containing the “peeled” onion Or+1, the “next destination” Pr+1,
and the nonce sr+1. Only the recipient PL+1 can peel the innermost onion OL+1
to reveal the message,
m← ProcOnion(skPL+1 , OL+1, PL+1).
Let O0 be an onion formed from running FormOnion(m0, P
0, pk0, s0), and let
O1 be another onion formed from running FormOnion(m1, P
1, pk1, s1). Impor-
tantly, a party that can’t peel either onion can’t tell which input produced which
onion. See Camenisch and Lysyanskaya’s paper [CL05] for formal definitions.
In our protocols, a sender of a message m to a recipient j “forms an onion”
by generating nonces and running the FormOnion algorithm on the message m,
a routing path (P1, . . . , PL, j), the public keys (pkP1 , . . . , pkPL , pkj) associated
with the parties on the routing path, and the generated nonces; the “formed
onion” is the first onion O1 from the list of outputted onions. The sender sends
O1 to the first party P1 on the routing path, who processes it and sends the
peeled onion O2 to the next destination P2, and so on, until the last onion OL+1
is received by the recipient j, who processes it to obtain the message m.
3 Definitions
We model the network as a graph with N nodes, and we assume that these
nodes are synchronized. This way, any onion can be sent from any sender to any
receiver, and also its transmission occurs within a single round.
Every participant is a user client, and some user clients also serve as mix-
nodes. In all the definitions, the N users participating in an communications
protocol Π are labeled 1, . . . , N ; and the number N of users is assumed to be
polynomially-bounded in the security parameter λ. Every input to a protocol is
an N -dimensional vector. When a protocol runs on input σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ), it
means that the protocol is instantiated with each user i receiving σi as input.M
denotes the (bounded) message space. A message pair (m, j) is properly formed
if m ∈ M and j ∈ [N ]. The input σi to each user i ∈ [N ] is a collection of
properly formed message pairs, where (m, j) ∈ σi means that user i intends on
sending message m to user j. Let M(σ) denote the “messages in σ”. It is the
multiset of all message pairs in σ, that is
M(σ1, . . . , σN ) =
N⋃
i=1
{(m, j) ∈ σi} .
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For analyzing our solutions, it is helpful to first assume an idealized version
of an encryption scheme, in which the ciphertexts are information-theoretically
unrelated to the plaintexts that they encrypt and reveal nothing but the length
of the plaintext. Obviously, such encryption schemes do not exist computation-
ally, but only in a hybrid model with an oracle that realizes an ideal encryption
functionality, such as that of Canetti [Can01]. When used in forming onions, such
an encryption scheme gives rise to onions that are information-theoretically in-
dependent of their contents, destinations, and identities of the mix-nodes. Our
real-life proposal, of course, will use standard computationally secure encryp-
tion [DDN00]. We discuss the implications of this in Appendix A.
Views and outputs. We consider the following standard adversary models, in
increasing order of capabilities:
1. Network adversary. A network adversary can observe the bits flowing on
every link of the network. (Note that if the peer-to-peer links are encrypted
in an idealized sense, then the only information that the adversary can use
is the volume flow.)
2. Passive adversary. In addition to the capabilities of a network adversary,
a passive adversary can monitor the internal states and operations of a con-
stant fraction of the parties. The adversary’s choices for which parties to
monitor are made non-adaptively over the course of the execution run.
3. Active adversary. In addition to the capabilities of a network adversary,
an active adversary can corrupt a constant fraction of the parties. The ad-
versary’s choices for which parties to corrupt are made non-adaptively over
the course of the execution run. The adversary can change the behavior of
corrupted parties to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol.
Let Π be a protocol, and let σ be a vector of inputs to Π . Given an adver-
sary A, the view V Π,A(σ) of A is its observables from participating in Π on
input σ plus any randomness used to make its decisions. With idealized secure
peer-to-peer links, the observables for a network adversary are the traffic volumes
on all links; whereas for the passive and active adversaries, the observables addi-
tionally include the internal states and computations of all monitored / corrupted
parties at all times.
Given an adversary A, the output OΠ,A(σ) = (OΠ,A1 (σ), . . . , OΠ,AN (σ)) of Π
on input σ is a vector of outputs for the N parties.
3.1 Privacy definitions
How do we define security for an anonymous channel? The adversary’s view also
includes the internal states of corrupted parties. In such case, we may wish to
protect the identities of honest senders from the recipients that are in cahoots
with the adversary. However, even an ideal anonymous channel cannot prevent
the contents of messages (including the volumes of messages) from providing
a clue on who sent the messages; thus any “message content” leakage should
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be outside the purview of an anonymous channel. To that end, we say that an
communications protocol is secure if it is difficult for the adversary to learn who
is communicating with whom, beyond what leaks from captured messages.
Below, we provide two flavors of this security notion; we will prove that our
constructions achieve either statistical privacy or (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [Dwo14,
Defn. 2.4] in the idealized encryption setting.
Definition 2 (Statistical privacy). Let Σ∗ be the input set consisting of every
input of the form
σ = ({(m1, π(1))}, . . . , {(mN , π(N))}),
where π : [N ]→ [N ] is any permutation function over the set [N ], and mi ∈M
for every i ∈ [N ]. A communications protocol Π is statistically private from
every adversary from the class A if for all A ∈ A and for all σ0, σ1 ∈ Σ∗
that differ only on the honest parties’ inputs and outputs, the adversary’s views
V Π,A(σ0) and V Π,A(σ1) are statistically indistinguishable, i.e.,
∆(V Π,A(σ0), V Π,A(σ1)) = negl(λ),
where λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter, and ∆(·, ·) denotes statistical dis-
tance (i.e., total variation distance). Π is perfectly secure if the statistical dis-
tance is zero instead.
Definition 3 (Distance between inputs). The distance d(σ0, σ1) between
two inputs σ0 = (σ0,1, . . . , σ0,N ) and σ1 = (σ1,1, . . . , σ1,N ) is given by
d(σ0, σ1)
def
=
N∑
i=1
|σ0,i∇σ1,i|,
where (·∇·) denotes the symmetric difference.
Definition 4 (Neighboring inputs). Two inputs σ0 and σ1 are neighboring
if d(σ0, σ1) ≤ 1.
Definition 5 ((ǫ, δ)-DP [Dwo14, Defn. 2.4]). Let Σ be the set of all valid in-
puts. A communications protocol is (ǫ, δ)-DP from every adversary in the class A
if for all A ∈ A, for every neighboring inputs σ0, σ1 ∈ Σ that differ only on an
honest party’s input and an honest party’s output, and any set V of views,
Pr[V Π,A(σ0) ∈ V ] ≤ eǫ · Pr[V Π,A(σ1) ∈ V ] + δ.
While differential privacy is defined with respect to neighboring inputs, it also
provides (albeit weaker) guarantees for non-neighboring inputs; it is known that
the security parameters degrade proportionally in the distance between the in-
puts [Dwo14].
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3.2 Other performance metrics
Since message delivery cannot be guaranteed in the presence of an active adver-
sary, we define correctness with respect to passive adversaries.
Definition 6 (Correctness). A communications protocol Π is correct on an
input σ ∈ Σ if for any passive adversary A, and for every recipient j ∈ [N ], the
output OΠ,Aj (σ) corresponds to the multiset of all messages for recipient j in the
input vector σ. That is,
OΠ,Aj (σ) = {m |(m, j) ∈M(σ)} ,
where M(σ) denotes the multiset of all messages in σ.
Efficiency of OR protocols. The communication complexity blow-up of an
onion routing (OR) protocol measures how many more onion transmissions are
required by the protocol, compared with transmitting the messages in onions
directly from the senders to the recipients (without passing through intermedi-
aries). We assume that every message m ∈ M in the message space M “fits”
into a single onion. The communication complexity is measured in unit onions,
which is appropriate when the parties pass primarily onions to each other.
Definition 7 (Communication complexity blow-up). The communication
complexity blow-up of an OR protocol Π is defined with respect to an input
vector σ and an adversary A. Denoted γΠ,A(σ), it is the expected ratio between
the total number ΓΠ,A(σ) of onions transmitted in protocol Π and the total
number |M(σ)| of messages in the input vector. That is,
γΠ,A(σ)
def
= E
[
ΓΠ,A(σ)
|M(σ)|
]
.
Definition 8 (Server load). The server load of an OR protocol Π is defined
with respect to an input vector σ and an adversary A. It is the expected number
of onions processed by a single party in a round.
Definition 9 (Latency). The latency of an OR protocol Π is defined with
respect to an input vector σ and an adversary A. It is the expected number of
rounds in a protocol execution.
In addition to having low (i.e., polylog in the security parameter) commu-
nication complexity blow-ups, we will show that our OR protocols have low
(i.e., polylog in the security parameter) server load and low (i.e., polylog in the
security parameter) latency.
4 The passive adversary
Communication patterns can trivially be hidden by sending every message to
every participant in the network, but this solution is not scalable as it requires a
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communication complexity blow-up that is linear in the number of participants.
Here, we prove that an OR protocol can provide anonymity from the passive
adversary while being practical with low communication complexity and low
server load.
To do this, every user must send and receive the same number of messages as
any other user; otherwise, the sender-receiver relation can leak from the differing
volumes of messages sent and received by the users. In other words, every user
essentially commits to sending a message, be it the empty message ⊥ to itself.
Let Σ∗ be the set of all input vectors of the form
σ = ({(m1, π(1))}, . . . , {(mN , π(N))}),
where π : [N ]→ [N ] is any permutation function over the set [N ], andm1, . . . ,mN
are any messages from the message space M; our solution, Πp, is presented in
the setting where the input vector is constrained to Σ∗.
Let [N ] be the set of users, and S = {S1, . . . , Sn} ⊂ [N ] the set of servers. Πp
uses a secure onion routing scheme, denoted byOR = (Gen,FormOnion,ProcOnion),
as a primitive building block. For every i ∈ [N ], let (pki, ski)← Gen(1λ) be the
key pair generated for party i, where λ denotes the security parameter.
During a setup phase, each user i ∈ [N ] creates an onion. On input σi =
{(m, j)}, user i first picks a sequence T1, . . . , TL servers, where each server is cho-
sen independently and uniformly at random, and then forms an onion from the
messagem, the routing path (T1, . . . , TL, j), the public keys (pkT1 , . . . , pkTL , pkj)
associated with the parties on the routing path, and a list of empty nonces. At
the first round of the protocol run, user i sends the formed onion to the first
hop T1 on the routing path.
After every round i ∈ [L] (but before round i + 1) of the protocol run, each
server processes the onions it received at round i. At round i + 1, the resulting
peeled onions are sent to their respective next destinations in random order. At
round L+ 1, every user receives an onion and processes it to reveal a message.
Correctness and efficiency. Clearly, Πp is correct. In Πp, N messages are
transmitted in each of the L+ 1 rounds of the protocol run. Thus, the commu-
nication complexity blow-up and the latency are both L + 1. The server load
is Nn .
Privacy. To prove that Πp is statistically private from the passive adversary,
we first prove that it is secure from the network adversary.
Theorem 10. Πp is statistically private from the network adversary when
N
n =
Ω(log2 λ), and L = Ω(log2 λ), where λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter.
Proof. Let A be any network adversary, and let U ∈ [N ] be any target sender.
Because A observes every link of the network, A observes the first hop taken by
U ’s onion at the first round of the protocol execution and knows, with certainty,
where U ’s onion is at this point in time. Let S be this location (i.e., server).
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At the next round, all the onions that were routed to S at the previous round,
emerge from S and are routed to their next destinations, each, from A’s per-
spective, having an equal 1k probability of being U ’s onion, where k denotes the
total number of onions that were routed to S at round 1. Continuing with this
analysis, from A’s perspective, the location of U ’s onion becomes progressively
more uncertain with every round of the protocol. Below, we show that after L
rounds, A’s “belief” of the location of U ’s onion is statistically indistinguishable
from the uniform distribution over the n possible locations.
Let Nn = α log
2 λ; so that after each round, every location receives α log2 λ
onions in expectation. We recast our problem as a balls-in-bins problem, where
the balls are the onions, and the bins, the locations. At every round of the
protocol, all αn log2 λ balls (i.e., onions) are thrown uniformly at random into n
bins (i.e., each onion is routed to one of n locations, chosen independently and
uniformly at random).
Fix any target sender U , and let Xr = (Xr1 , . . . , X
r
n) be a vector of non-
negative numbers summing to one, representingA’s best estimate for the location
of U ’s ball after r rounds (and before round r + 1); for every i ∈ [n], Xri is the
likelihood that bin i contains U ’s ball after r rounds. Let (Xrfr(1), . . . , X
r
fr(n)
) be
the result of sorting (Xr1 , . . . , X
r
n) in decreasing order, where fr : [n] → [n] is a
permutation function over the set [n]. For every i ∈ [n], let bri = fr(i) be the
index of the bin with the i-th largest likelihood at round r.
W.l.o.g. we assume that n is divisible by three. We partition the bins into
three groups Gr1, G
r
2, and G
r
3; such that G
r
1 contains all the balls in the top
one-third most likely bins br1, . . . , b
r
n
3
; Gr3 contains all the balls in the bottom
one-third most likely bins br2n
3 +1
, . . . , brn; and G
r
2 contains all the balls in the
remaining bins brn
3 +1
, . . . , br2n
3
.
For each j ∈ [3], let Orj ∈ Grj be a ball with the maximum likelihood of being
U ’s onion among the balls in group Grj . For any d ∈ (0, 1), let d′ = 1− 11+d . Let
crj be the bin containing O
r
j . The bin c
r
j contains at least (1 − d′)α log2 λ balls
(Appendix, Lemma 16a). It follows that,
Pr[Orj is U ’s onion] ≤ (1 + d)
Xrcrj
α log2 λ
≤ (1 + d)
Xr(j−1)n
3 +1
α log2 λ
(1)
with overwhelming probability, where Xr(j−1)n
3 +1
is the likelihood of the most
likely bin in group Gj .
The number of balls contained in each group Grj is arbitrarily close to the
expected number α3n log
2 λ of balls in a group (Appendix, Lemma 16b). Thus,
combined with Lemma 16a, the most probable bin br+11 after the next round
receives at most (1+d)α3 log
2 λ balls from each of the three groups: Gr1, G
r
2, and
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Gr3. From (1), this implies that, with overwhelming probability,
Pr[Xr+1 = br+11 ] ≤
3∑
j=1

 (1 + d)α3 log2 λ×
(1 + d)Pr
[
Xr = br(j−1)n
3 +1
]
α log2 λ


=
(1 + d)2
3
3∑
j=1
Pr
[
Xr = br(j−1)n
3 +1
]
.
Using a symmetric argument, we can conclude that, with overwhelming proba-
bility,
Xr+1n ≥
(1− d)2
3
3∑
j=1
Xrjn
3
,
where Xrjn
3
is the likelihood of the least likely bin in group Gj .
For all r ∈ [L], define gr = Xr1 −Xrn as the difference in likelihoods between
the most and least likely bins at round r.
gr+1 ≤
(1 + d)2
∑3
j=1X
r
(j−1)n
3 +1
3
−
(1 − d)2∑3j=1Xrjn
3
3
≤ 1
2
(Xr1 −Xrn) =
gr
2
,
where the latter inequality follows from telescopic cancelling, since
Xrn
3 +1
≤ Xrn
3
,
and
Xr2n
3 +1
≤ Xr2n
3
.
The difference gr is at least halved at every round. By round log2 λ, the
difference is negligible in λ. Thus, after traveling L random hops, each onion
becomes unlinked from its sender. Since everyone sends the same number of
onions, and everyone receives the same number of onions; it follows that the
adversary’s views from any two inputs are statistically indistinguishable.
In the proof above, the bins were partitioned into three groups at every round.
By partitioning the bins into an appropriately large constant number of groups,
we can show that Πp achieves statistical privacy after L = Ω(log
2 λ) rounds.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 11. Πp is statistically private from the passive adversary capable of
monitoring any constant fraction κ ∈ [0, 1) of the servers when Nn = Ω(log2 λ),
and L = Ω(log2 λ), where λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter.
Proof. We prove this by cases.
In the first case, σ1 is the same as σ0 except that the inputs of two users are
swapped, i.e., d(σ0, σ1) = 2. From Lemma 16b, there are at least some polylog
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number of rounds where the swapped onions are both routed to an honest bin
(not necessarily the same bin). From Theorem 10, after the polylog number of
steps, the locations of these two target onions are statistically indistinguishable
from each other.
In the second case, d(σ0, σ1) > 2. However, the distance between σ0 and σ1
is always polynomially bounded. By a simple hybrid argument, it follows that
V Π,A(σ0) ≈s V Π,A(σ1) from case 1.
Remark: Protocol Πp is not secure from the active adversary. This is be-
cause, with non-negligible probability, any honest user will choose a corrupted
party as its first hop on its onion’s routing path, in which case the adversary can
drop the target user’s onion at the first hop and observe who does not receive
an onion at the last round.
5 The active adversary
We now present an OR protocol, Πa, that is secure from the active adversary.
The setting for Πa is different from that of our previous solution in a couple of
important ways. Whereas Πp is statistically private from the passive adversary,
Πa is only differentially private from the active adversary. The upside is that we
are no longer constrained to operate in the simple I/O setting; the input can be
any valid input.
We let [N ] be the set of N parties participating in a protocol. Every party
is both a user and a server. As before, OR = (Gen,FormOnion,ProcOnion) is a
secure onion routing scheme; and for every i ∈ [N ], (pki, ski)← Gen(1λ) denotes
the key pair generated for party i, where λ is the security parameter. Further,
we assume that every pair (i, k) ∈ [N ]2 of parties shares a common secret key3,
denoted by ski,k. F is a pseudorandom function (PRF).
We describe the protocol by the setup and routing algorithms for party i ∈
[N ]; each honest party runs the same algorithms.
Setup. Let L = β log2 λ for some constant β > 0. During the setup phase,
party i prepares a set of onions from its input. For every message pair u =
{m, j} in party i’s input, party i picks a sequence T u1 , . . . , T uL of parties, where
each party T uℓ is chosen independently and uniformly at random, and forms
an onion from the message m, the routing path (T u1 , . . . , T
u
L , j), the public
keys (pkTu1 , . . . , pkTuL , pkj), and a list of empty nonces.
Additionally, party i forms some dummy onions, where a dummy onion is an
onion formed using the empty message ⊥.
1. for every index (r, k) ∈ [L]× [N ]:
(a) compute b ← F (ski,k, session+ r, 0), where session ∈ N denotes the pro-
tocol instance.
3 In practice, the shared keys do not need to be set up in advance; they can be
generated as needed from an existing PKI, e.g., using Diffie-Hellman.
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(b) if b ≡ 1 — set to occur with frequency α log2 λN for some constant α > 0
— do:
i. choose a list T r,k = (T r,k1 , . . . , T
r,k
r−1, T
r,k
r+1, . . . , T
r,k
L+1) of parties, where
each party is chosen independently and uniformly at random;
ii. create a list sr,k = (sr,k1 , . . . , s
r,k
L ) of nonces, where
sr,kr = (checkpt, F (ski,k, session+ r, 1)),
and all other elements of sr,k are ⊥; and
iii. form a dummy onion using the message ⊥, the routing path T r,k,
the public keys associated with T r,k, and the list sr,k of nonces.
(c) end if
2. end for
The additional information sr,kr is embedded in only the r-th layer; no ad-
ditional information is embedded in any other layer. At the first round of the
protocol run (after setup), all formed onions are sent to their respective first
hops.
Routing. If party i forms a dummy onion with nonce sr,kr embedded in the r-th
layer, then it expects to receive a symmetric dummy onion at the r-th round
formed by another party k that, when processed, reveals the same nonce sr,kr . If
many checkpoint nonces are missing, then party i knows to abort the protocol
run.
After every round r ∈ [L] (but before round r+1), party i peels the onions it
received at round r and counts the number of missing checkpoint nonces. If the
count exceeds a threshold value t, the party aborts the protocol run; otherwise,
at round r + 1, the peeled onions are sent to their next destinations in random
order. After the final round, party i outputs the set of messages revealed from
processing its the onions it receives at round L+ 1.
Correctness and efficiency. Recalling that correctness is defined with respect
to the passive adversary, Πa is clearly correct. Moreover, unless an honest party
aborts the protocol run, all messages that are not dropped by the adversary are
delivered to their final destinations. In Πa, the communication complexity blow-
up is O(log6 λ), since the latency is L + 1 = O(log2 λ) rounds, and the server
load is O(log4 λ).
Privacy. To prove that Πa is secure, we require that the thresholding mecha-
nism does its job:
Lemma 12. In Πa, if F is a random function, t = c(1− d)(1− κ)2α log2 λ for
some c, d ∈ (0, 1), and an honest party does not abort within the first r rounds
of the protocol run, then with overwhelming probability, at least (1 − c) of the
dummy onions created between honest parties survive at least (r − 1) rounds,
even in the presence of an active adversary non-adaptively corrupting a constant
fraction κ ∈ [0, 1) of the parties.
14
The proof relies on a known concentration bound for the hypergeometric
distribution [HS05] and can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 13. If, in Πa, F is a random function, N ≥ 31−κ , and t = c(1 −
d)(1−κ)2α log2 λ for some c, d ∈ (0, 1), then, for αβ ≥ − 36(1+ǫ/2)2 ln(δ/4)(1−c)(1−κ)2ǫ2 , Πa is
(ǫ, δ)-DP from the active adversary non-adaptively corrupting a constant fraction
κ ∈ [0, 1) of the parties.
Proof. The proof is by cases.
Case 1: All honest parties abort within the first half of the protocol run. In
this case, with overwhelming probability, no onion created by an honest party
will be delivered to its final destination. This is because each intermediary hop of
every onion created by an honest party is chosen independently and uniformly at
random. Thus, there is only a negligible probability of the latter half of an onion’s
routing path passing through only corrupted parties (Lemma 16b). Since there
are a polynomial number of onions, by the union bound, the probability that
there exists an onion whose routing path passes through only corrupted parties
is negligibly small. Since no onion created by an honest party is delivered to its
final destination, the adversary doesn’t learn anything.
Case 2: Some honest party doesn’t abort within the first half of the protocol
run. Let A be any adversary that non-adaptively corrupts a constant κ ∈ [0, 1) of
the parties. Suppose that for every onion that survive the first half of the protocol
run, a dark angel provides the adversary A with the second half of the onion’s
routing path. Further suppose that no other onions are dropped in the second
half of the protocol run. (If more onions are dropped, then Πa is secure from the
post-processing theorem for differential privacy [Dwo14, Proposition 2.1].)
For any two neighboring inputs σ0 and σ1, the only difference in the adver-
sary’s views, V Πa,A(σ0) and V Πa,A(σ1), is the routing of a single onion O. If
there is an honest party who does not abort within the first half of the protocol
run, then from Lemma 12, some constant fraction of the dummy onions created
by the honest parties survive the first half of the protocol run with overwhelming
probability. So, from Theorem 11, the onions are no longer linked to their senders
by the end of the first half of the protocol run. Thus, the only information that
A could find useful is the volume of onions sent out by the sender Ps of the extra
onion O and the volume of onions received by the receiver Pr of O.
Let X denote the number of dummy onions created by Ps. For every (k, r) ∈
[L]× [N ], an honest sender Ps creates a dummy onion with probability α log
2 λ
N ;
so X ∼ Binomial(H, p), where H = LN , and p = α log2 λN .
Let Y ∼ Binomial(G, q) be another binomial random variable with param-
eters G = L(1−κ)
2N2
3 and q =
(1−c)α log2 λ
N2 . For N ≥ 31−κ and sufficiently small
d > 0, G ≤ (1 − d)L((1−κ)N−12 ); thus, with overwhelming probability, Y is less
than the number of dummy onions created between honest non-Ps parties and
received by Pr in the final round (Chernoff bounds).
Let O def= N × N be the sample space for the multivariate random vari-
able (X,Y ).
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Let O1 be the event that |X − E[X ]| ≤ d′E[X ], and |Y − E[Y ]| ≤ d′E[Y ],
where d′ = ǫ/21+ǫ/2 , E[X ] = Hp is the expected value of X , and E[Y ] = Gq is the
expected value of Y ; and let O¯1 be the complement of O1.
For every (x, y) ∈ O1, we can show that
max
(
Pr[(X,Y ) = (x, y)]
Pr[(X,Y ) = (x+ 1, y + 1)]
,
Pr[(X,Y ) = (x+ 1, y + 1)]
Pr[(X,Y ) = (x, y)]
)
≤ eǫ. (2)
We can also show that the probability of the tail event O¯1 occurring is negligible
in λ and at most δ when αβ ≥ − 36(1+ǫ/2)2 ln(δ/4)(1−c)(1−κ)2ǫ2 . (See Appendix B.)
Any event E can be decomposed into two subsets E1 and E2, such that (1) E =
E1 ∪ E2, (2) E1 ⊆ O1, and (3) E2 ⊆ O¯1. It follows that, for every event E ,
Pr[(X,Y ) ∈ E ] ≤ eǫ · Pr[(X + 1, Y + 1) ∈ E ] + δ, and (3)
Pr[(X + 1, Y + 1) ∈ E ] ≤ eǫ · Pr[(X,Y ) ∈ E ] + δ. (4)
The views V Πa,A(σ0) and V Πa,A(σ1) are the same except that O exists in
one of the views but not in the other. Thus, (3) and (4) suffice to show that for
any set V of views and for any b ∈ {0, 1}, Pr[V Πa,Ab ∈ V ] ≤ eǫ ·Pr[V Πa,Ab¯ ∈ V ]+δ,
where b¯ = b + 1 mod 2.
Remark: Our protocols are for a single-pass setting, where the users send
out messages once. It is clear how our statistical privacy results would compose
for the multi-pass case. To prove that Πa also provides differential privacy in the
multi-pass scenario — albeit for degraded security parameters — we can use the
k-fold composition theorem [Dwo14]; the noise falls at a rate of the square-root
of the number of runs.
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A In the standard model
A protocol that uses cryptographic tools like public-key encryption and authen-
tication can only be differentially private when idealized versions of the tools are
used. In practice, the best we can achieve is the computational analogue.
Definition 14 (ǫ-IND-CDP [MPRV09]). Let Σλ be the set of all possible
polynomially sized (w.r.t. λ) input vectors. A communications protocol Π is ǫ-
IND-CDP from every adversary in a class {Aλ}λ∈N of non-uniform probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries if for any adversary Aλ, any two neighboring
inputs σ0,λ, σ1,λ ∈ Σλ that differ only on the honest parties’ inputs, and any
polynomially sized advice string zλ,
Pr[Aλ(1λ, V Π,A0,λ , zλ) = 1] ≤ eǫ · Pr[Aλ(1λ, V Π,A1,λ , zλ) = 1] + negl(λ),
where λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter.
In Theorem 13 we proved that Πa achieves differential privacy when the
onions were constructed using idealized (information-theoretically secure) public-
key encryption, and when the function F for generating checkpoint onions is
truly random. Such idealized encryption does not exist, and truly random func-
tions are not available, either. So our actual proposed solution is to use standard
computationally secure tools instead. In this case, Πa achieves ǫ-IND-CDP:
Theorem 15. If Πa is constructed using a CCA2-secure encryption scheme and
pseudorandom function F , and if in Πa, n ≥ 31−κ , and
t = c(1− d)(1 − κ)2α log2 λ
for some c, d ∈ (0, 1), then for sufficiently large protocol parameters α and β, Πa
is ǫ-IND-CDP from an active adversary capable of (non-adaptively) corrupting
a constant fraction κ ∈ [0, 1) of the parties.
Proof. The proof is by a relatively standard hybrid argument; here we present
it in the language of Canetti’s universal composability [Can01]. Let Fenc be an
ideal public-key encryption functionality and FPRF be an ideal pseudorandom
function functionality.
Recall that a CCA2-secure cryptosystem UC-realizes the (non-adaptive)Fenc
functionality, while a secure PRF UC-realizes the FPRF functionality. That
means that (1) there exist simulators Senc and SPRF that, in combination with
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Fenc and FPRF, respectively, realize idealized non-adaptive public-key encryp-
tion and a pseudorandom function, respectively. Moreover, (2) for any PPT envi-
ronment and adversary, the view that the adversary obtains in the (Fenc,FPRF)-
hybrid model with these simulators is indistinguishable from its view when the
CCA2 scheme and the PRF are used instead.
Let {σ0,λ} and {σ1,λ} be a sequence of neighboring inputs to Πa, parameter-
ized by the security parameter λ, and let A be a non-uniform PPT adversary.
By V A,Π
ideal
(σb,λ) let us denote A’s view in the protocol Π with input σb,λ where
the encryption and PRF are realized using their ideal functionalities with the
simulators. By V A,Π
real
(σb,λ), let us denote the corresponding view where they are
realized using the CCA2 encryption scheme and the PRF.
Using (1), by Theorem 13,Πa provides (ǫ, δ)-DP privacy when the encryption
and the PRF are realized using the simulator with Fenc and FPRF, and so
Pr[Aλ(1λ, V A,Πaideal (σ0,λ), zλ) = 1] ≤ eǫ · Pr[Aλ(1λ, V A,Πaideal (σ1,λ), zλ) = 1] + δ.
Using (2), we know that for b ∈ {0, 1},
|Pr[Aλ(1λ, V A,Πareal (σb,λ), zλ) = 1]− Pr[Aλ(1λ, V A,Πaideal (σb,λ), zλ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
Putting the two together, and keeping in mind that δ is negligible in λ, we get
the theorem.
Deriving pairwise PRF keys using a PKI. Recall that Πa requires that
any pair of clients, Pi and Pj , are in possession of a shared PRF key ski,j . What
would be more desirable is if they could derive a shared PRF key using the
public-key infrastructure.
Under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the non-adaptive cor-
ruption setting this can be accomplished as follows. Let g be a generator of a
group G of order q in which the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption
holds; and suppose that these are publicly available. Let a random xi ∈ Zq be
part of every Pi’s secret key, and let Yi = g
xi be part of Pi’s public key. Then,
Zi,j = Y
xj
i = Y
xi
j can serve as a PRF key for an appropriate choice of a PRF
F ′, namely, one that is a PRF when the seed is chosen as a random element of
the group G. For example, using the leftover hash lemma [ILL89], we can use
F ′Zi,j (a) = F
∗
H(Zi,j )
(a) where H is a universal hash function, and F ∗ is any PRF.
To sum it up, our proposed construction for how Pi computes the shared
PRF for Pj on input a is: F (ski, pkj , a) = F
′
Y
xi
j
(a), where xi ∈ Zq is part of
Pi’s secret key, Yj = g
xj is part of Pj ’s public key, and F
′ is any PRF keyed by
random elements of G.
To show that no PPT adversary can distinguish whether (Case A) all honest
Pi and Pj are using this construction or (Case B) a truly random function, we
will use a standard hybrid argument.
Consider the hybrid experiment EH in which all honest pairs Pi and Pj have
a truly random si,j ∈ G, and use it as a seed to F ′. It is straightforward to see
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that an adversary distinguishing this experiment from Case B breaks the PRF
F ′.
Suppose that we have N ′ honest clients. So now consider a series of exper-
iments E0, . . . , E(N
′
2 )
in which the honest pairs of clients are ordered in some
fashion, and the first u pairs will use truly random seeds si,j while the rest com-
pute si,j = Y
xi
j = Y
xj
i . Since E0 is identical to EH above, and E(N
′
2 )
is identical
to Case A, by the hybrid argument it is sufficient to show that, for every u, no
adversary can distinguish Eu from Eu+1.
Our reduction is given a decisional Diffie-Hellman challenge (g,A,B,C) =
(g, gα, gβ, gγ) and needs to distinguish whether γ = αβ or random. Let PI and
PJ be the (u+1)
st pair of honest clients. Let YI = A and YJ = B, and for all the
other Pi, let Yi = g
xi for some xi that the reduction knows. For the first u pairs
of honest clients, Pi and Pj , let si,j be a truly random PRF seed picked by the
reduction. When the adversary queries for F (ski, pkj , a), the reduction responds
with F ′si,j (a) whenever (Pi, Pj) are among the first u pairs, with F
′
Zi,j
(a) if they
are among the last
(
N ′
2
)−u−1 pairs, where Zi,j = Y xji and the reduction knows,
w.l.o.g. xj , and with F
′
C(a) if i = I and j = J . If γ = αβ, then the view the
adversary gets is identical to Eu; but if it is random, then it is identical to Eu+1.
This completes the proof.
B Supplementary proofs
B.1 A useful lemma from Chernoff bounds
We make use of the following facts derived from Chernoff bounds, which allow
us to make the arguments that certain favorable events occur with overwhelming
probability as opposed to merely occurring in expectation.
Lemma 16. If N = poly(λ) balls are thrown independently and uniformly at
random into n = O(N/ log2 λ) bins, then
a. For any 0 < d ≤ 1, the number of balls thrown into any bin is at least
(1 − d)Nn and at most (1 + d)Nn with overwhelming probability with respect
to the parameter λ.
b. For any 0 < d ≤ 1, the number of balls thrown into any set of k ∈ [n] bins
is at least (1 − d)kNn and at most (1 + d)kNn with overwhelming probability
with respect to the parameter λ.
Proof. (of a.) For all i ∈ [n], let Oi denote the number of balls in bin i. The
probability that the number of balls in a fixed bin i ∈ [n] is significantly off
from the expected number of balls can be bounded by a Chernoff bound [MU05,
Cor. 4.6]:
Pr[|Oi − E[Oi]| ≥ dE[Oi]] ≤ 2e−d
2
E[Oi]/3.
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So, by the union bound, the probability that any bin has significantly more or
less than the expected number of balls is negligible in λ:
Pr[∃i : |Oi − E[Oi]| ≥ dE[Oi]] ≤ 2n
ed2·Θ(log2)λ/3
=
1
λΘ(log
c λ)
.
(of b.) We prove this by contradiction. We assume the (absolute value) dif-
ference between the actual number of balls in k bins and the expected number
of balls in k bins can exceed dkE[Oi] with non-negligible probability. By the
pigeonhole principle, there must exist a bin such that the (absolute value) dif-
ference between the actual number of balls its holds and the expected number
of balls for a single bin exceeds dE[Oi]. This contradicts part a of the lemma.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 12
Proof. Let A be any active adversary capable of non-adaptively corrupting a
constant fraction κ ∈ [0, 1) of the network. Since A controls the corrupted par-
ties, it can know the checkpoint round, location, and nonce of any onion created
between a corrupted party and any other party. Thus, we assume that any onion
created between a corrupted party and any other party can be replaced by A
without the replacement being detected by any honest party. Suppose that A
has help from a dark angel who marks every onion created between a corrupted
party and any other party, so that A can replace all marked onions without
detection. Even so, without eliminating some unmarked onions, some positive
constant fraction of the dummy onions would survive (Lemma 16b).
Let an onion created between two honest parties be called unmarked, and
consider only unmarked onions. For any onion with a checkpoint in the future,
the probability that the adversaryA can drop the onion without any honest party
detecting that the onion was dropped is negligibly small; A cannot produce the
correct checkpoint nonce with sufficiently high probability.
At any round r, A is unable to distinguish between any two unmarked onions.
Let u denote the total number of unmarked onions. Again relying on Chernoff
bounds (Lemma 16b),
u ≥ (1− d1)(1 − κ)2αLN log2 λ
for any 0 < d1 < d.
Let vr denote the cumulative number of unmarked onions that have been
eliminated by A so far at round r. If an honest party i does not detect more
than
(1− d2)cu
LN
≥ (1− d1)(1 − d2)c(1 − κ)2α log2 λ = (1− d)c(1 − κ)2α log2 λ
missing onions, then with overwhelming probability, vr−1 ≤ cu. (This follows
from a known concentration bound for the hypergeometric distribution [HS05]).
Thus, at least 1− c of all dummy onions created between honest parties survive
until round r − 1, with overwhelming probability.
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B.3 Proof of Equation (2)
Proof. Let E be the event that |Y − E[Y ]| ≤ d′E[Y ], and let f(·) denote the
probability mass function of Y . Letting y′ def= argmaxy∈E
max(f(y),f(y+1))
min(f(y),f(y+1)) ,
y′ = (1 − d′)Gq = Gq
1 + ǫ
=
CGCq
1 + ǫ
log2 λ
where CG =
L(1−κ)2
3 , and Cq = (1 − c)α. This is true, because
max
y:Gq−d≤y≤Gq
f(y + 1)
f(y)
> max
y:Gq≤y≤Gq+d
f(y)
f(y + 1)
whenever q < 12 .
f(y′ + 1)
f(y′)
=
(
G
y′+1
)
qy
′+1(1− q)N−y′−1(
G
y′
)
qy′(1− q)N−y′
=
G!qy
′+1(1− q)N−y′−1
(y′ + 1)!(G− y′ − 1)! ·
y′!(G− y′)!
H !qy′(1 − q)N−y′
=
(G− y′)q
(y′ + 1)(1− q)
=
(
CGN
2 − CGCq1+ǫ log2 λ
)
Cq
log2 λ
N2(
CGCq
1+ǫ log
2 λ+ 1
)(
1− Cq log2 λN2
)
=
1 + ǫ/2
1 + ǫ/2
(
CGN
2 − CGCq1+ǫ log2 λ
)
(
CGCq
1+ǫ log
2 λ+ 1
) · N2
N2
Cq
log2 λ
N2(
1− Cq log2 λN2
)
=
Cq log
2 λ
CGCq log
2 λ+ (1 + ǫ/2)
· (1 + ǫ/2)CGN
2 − CGCq log2 λ
N2 − Cq log2 λ
=
CGCq log
2 λ
CGCq log
2 λ+ (1 + ǫ/2)
· (1 + ǫ/2)N
2 − Cq log2 λ
N2 − Cq log2 λ
≤ (1 + ǫ/2)N
2 − Cq log2 λ
N2 − Cq log2 λ
≤ 1 + ǫ/2.
Since 1 + ǫ/2 ≤ eǫ/2 whenever ǫ/2 ≥ 0,
max
(
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[Y = y + 1]
,
Pr[Y = y + 1]
Pr[Y = y]
)
≤ eǫ/2
for every outcome y ∈ E. Using a similar argument, we can show that
max
(
Pr[X = x]
Pr[X = x+ 1]
,
Pr[X = x+ 1]
Pr[X = x]
)
≤ eǫ/2
for every outcome x ∈ [Hp− d′, Hp+ d′]. Since X and Y are independent, this
completes our argument.
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B.4 Proof of Equation (3)
Proof. From [MU05, Cors. 4.6],
Pr[|Y − E[Y ]| ≥ d′E[Y ]] ≤ 2e−E[Y ](d′)2/3,
and 2e−E[Y ](d
′)2/3 ≤ δ/2 when
αβ ≥ −36(1 + ǫ/2)
2 ln (δ/4)
(1− c)(1 − κ)2ǫ2 .
The tail event for X can be bounded in a similar fashion.
C OR protocols for the network adversary
In this section, each user sends a single message and receives a single message.
Stated more precisely, the input is of the form
σ = ({(m1, π(1))}, . . . , {(mN , π(N))}),
where π : [N ]→ [N ] is any permutation function over the set [N ], andm1, . . . ,mN
are any messages from the message space M.
C.1 The basic construction
Our first construction, Πn, builds on Ohrimenko et al.’s basic oblivious permu-
tation algorithm [OGTU14]. A node is either a user client or a server that serves
as a mix-node. We let [N ] be the set of users, and S = {S1, . . . , Sn} the set
of servers, where N = n2. The scheme OR = (Gen,FormOnion,ProcOnion) is a
secure onion routing scheme; and for every i ∈ [N ], (pki, ski)← Gen(1λ) denotes
the key pair generated for party i.
Every user creates an onion during setup, and everyone’s onions are released
simultaneously at the start of the protocol run. Every user i ∈ [N ] constructs an
onion with a routing path of length three, where the first two hops (the inter-
mediary nodes) T1 and T2 are chosen independently and uniformly at random
from the set S of servers. Given the input {(m, j)}, the onion is formed from the
message m, the routing path (T1, T2, j), (pkT1 , pkT2 , pkj), and the list (⊥,⊥) of
empty nonces.
All onions are released simultaneously at the first round of the protocol run.
In between the first round and the second round, each first-hop server Si peels off
the outermost layer of its received onions and creates a packet of size k = α logλ
onions for each second-hop server Sj , where λ is the security parameter; each
packet is a set of all onions for Sj plus dummy onions as required
4. The prepared
onions, including dummies, are sent to their next destinations at the second
4 If the server needs to send more than α log λ onions to some recipient, the packet
size will be higher and without any additional dummy onions.
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round. Between the second and third rounds, every second-hop server Sj peels off
the outermost layers of its received onions, drops the dummy onions, and sends
the real onions to their intended recipients in random order. Upon receiving an
onion, each user processes its received onion and outputs the revealed message.
(In Ohrimenko et al.’s construction, “each user” is directly connected to an
assigned “server node”; whereas in our construction, each intermediary hops on
a routing path is chosen independently and uniformly at random. This allows us
to cut the latency by half.)
Clearly, Πn is correct. The communication complexity blow-up of Πn is
O(log λ); N onions are transmitted from the users to the servers in round 1,
αN logλ onions are transmitted from servers to servers in round 2 with over-
whelming probability, and N onions are transmitted from servers back to user in
round 3. The latency of Πn is three rounds, and the server load is O(
√
N logλ).
Theorem 17. Protocol Πn is statistically private against the network adversary
for α ≥ e2 .
Proof. We can bound the probability of the event of a packet overflow as follows:
For any chosen pair of indices (i, j) ∈ [n]2, the number Xi,j of onions that
are routed first to Si and then to Sj can be modeled by a Poisson random
variable with event rate 1. This is true because N = n2 onions are each binned
to an independently and uniformly random index-pair (i, j) ∈ [n]2, and so we
may approximate the numbers of onions that map to the n2 pairs of indices as
independent Poisson random variables [MU05, Ch. 5.4].
From above, the probability that at least k onions are first routed to Si and
then to Sj is equivalent to the probability that a realization of a random variable
Xi,j ∼ Poisson(1) is at least k. We can bound the probability of this event using
Chernoff bounds for Poisson random variables [MU05, Thm. 4.4.1]. Since k > 1
for sufficiently large λ:
Pr [Xi,j ≥ k] ≤ 1
e
( e
k
)k
.
So, from the union bound and the hypothesis that α ≥ e2 ,
Pr
[∃(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : Xi,j ≥ k] ≤ n2
e
(
e
2α logλ
)2α log n
=
1
λΩ(log log λ)
= negl(λ).
Since the probability of an overflow is negligibly small and independent of
the input vector, we can conclude that Πn is statistically private.
C.2 The tunable construction
Our tunable OR protocol, Π+n , is an adaptation of Ohrimenko et al.’s optimized
oblivious permutation algorithm [OGTU14].
The protocol description (below) refers to a butterfly network with branching
factor B and height H , where the number n′ = BH−1 of processor nodes is set
to n′ = n
α log2 λ
for some positive constant α > 0. The processor nodes also serve
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as the switching nodes at every depth i ∈ [H ] of the butterfly network. We define
a set of nodes be a subnet if every edge with an endpoint in the set has as the
other endpoint, a node in the set.
In Π+n , there are N users, 1, . . . , N ; and there are n
′ servers, T1, . . . , Tn′ ,
corresponding to the processor nodes. Every user creates an onion during setup,
and everyone’s onions are released simultaneously at the start of the protocol run.
To create an onion, user i first chooses random entry and exit points W1,WH
$←−
[n′]. The routing path of the onion is set to the path p = W1, . . . ,WH from
the entry W1 to the exit WH in the butterfly network. On input σi = {(m, j)},
user i forms an onion from the message m, the recipient j, the routing path
p, the public keys of the parties associated with the parties on p, and a list of
empty nonces. At the first round of the protocol run, the user sends the formed
onion to the first hop W1.
For every r ∈ [H ], in between rounds r and r + 1 of the protocol run, each
server Ti peels off the outermost layer of each received onion. Let λ denote
the security parameter. For every next destination Tj, Ti creates a packet of
k = (1 + d)α log2 λ onions, containing all the onions whose next destination is
Tj , plus dummy onions as needed. These formed onions are sent to their next
destinations at round r + 1. In the final round r = H + 1, the servers deliver
the onions to the users. Upon receiving an onion, each user processes it and
outputs the revealed message. (In Ohrimenko et al.’s construction, “each user”
is directly connected to an assigned “server node”; whereas in our construction,
each intermediary hops on a routing path is chosen independently and uniformly
at random. This allows us to cut the latency by half.)
Clearly, Π+n is correct.
Theorem 18. Letting λ denote the security parameter, for any B ∈ [
√
N
log2 λ
],
protocol Π+n can be set to run in O(
logN
logB ) rounds with server load O(B log
2 λ)
and communication complexity overhead O(B logN log
2 λ
logB ).
Proof. The proof follows from setting B to branching factor in the butterfly
network.
Theorem 19. Protocol Π+n , with security parameter λ ∈ N, is statistically pri-
vate against the network adversary for n = poly(λ).
Proof. Conditioned on no server-to-server packet exceeding size k = (1+d)α log2 λ,
the adversary’s view is the same regardless of the input. Moreover, the proba-
bility of a packet overflow is negligibly small (Lemma 16).
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